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Enforcement actions and bank behavior 
 
Abstract 
Employing a unique dataset for the period 2000-2010, this paper examines the impact of 
enforcement actions (sanctions) on bank capital, risk, and performance. We find that high risk-
weighted asset ratios tend to attract supervisory intervention. Sanctions whose cause lies at the 
core of bank safety and soundness curtail the risk-weighted asset ratio, but amplify the risk of 
insolvency and returns volatility, which implies that these sanctions do not improve the risk 
profile of the involved banks, possibly because they come too late. Sanctions targeting internal 
control and risk management weaknesses appear to be well-timed and to restrain further 
increases in the risk-weighted assets ratio without impairing bank fundamentals. Sanctions 
against institution-affiliated parties do not seem to affect bank behavior. We suggest that 
supervisory attention should be placed on the timely uncovering of internal control and risk 
management deficiencies as this would allow the early tackling of the origins of financial 
distress.     
 
 
JEL classification: G01; G21; G28 
Keywords: Enforcement actions; banking supervision; capital; bank risk; bank performance 
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1. Introduction 
The financial turmoil that started in 2007 and led to a panic in the fall of 2008 depicted with 
unparalleled force the weaknesses of the existing financial architecture and underlined the 
importance of rethinking the current regulatory and supervisory framework, especially in the 
area of banking. A number of research studies (e.g., Caprio et al., 2008; Delis and Staikouras, 
2011; Masciandaro et al., 2011) that focus on the quality of supervision conclude that 
enforcement, rather than mere adoption of laws and regulations, constitutes the most vital 
component of effective banking supervision. Along the same line, the Basel Committee 
corroborates that appropriate remedial actions make up an indispensable ingredient of an 
efficient supervisory review process under Pillar 2 of the Basel capital adequacy regime (Basel, 
2006).   
 This paper examines the impact that the imposition of sanctions may have on the bank’s 
risk-based capital, overall risk, and performance. The identification of changes in these 
fundamentals would not only enrich our understanding of the impact of supervisory 
enforcement on bank risk strategies and performance but also allow the deduction of valuable 
policy lessons on how to enhance supervisory effectiveness. To carry out this analysis, we 
employ a unique dataset of enforcement actions imposed on individual U.S. banks over the 
period 2000-2010. We consider all actions enacted by the three U.S. supervisory bodies of the 
banking system, namely, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). Moreover, we 
distinguish between different classes (types) of sanctions as these may have a very different 
impact on bank capital, risk, and performance. Specifically, we differentiate between four types 
of sanctions according to their potential influence on bank safety and soundness, with class 1 
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including those actions that are at the core of bank safety and soundness, and class 4 those that 
are unlikely to bear on banks’ safety and soundness. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
that investigates the effect that both enforcement actions, as a whole, and different types of 
sanctions may have on key bank fundamentals.  
 Our empirical strategy follows a well-established literature that considers the impact of 
an event on various aspects of the involved firm, here, the bank (see, e.g., Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001; Norden and Weber, 2010; Baek et al., 2011). We also complement this 
econometric analysis with relevant figures showing the evolution of bank fundamentals before 
and after the enforcement action is imposed. In a nutshell, the results show that enforcement 
actions are imposed primarily on banks with high levels of risk-weighted assets. Following the 
imposition of an enforcement action, the risk-weighted assets ratio of the involved bank 
declines to levels approximately equal to the median of the industry, whereas profitability 
appears to increase. However, this development comes at a high cost: both the volatility of 
returns and the risk of insolvency increase. 
 We obtain a significantly different picture when we decompose sanctions into diverse 
classes and separately assess the effect of each on the selected response variables. Indeed, we 
show that supervisors are slow to impose class 1 sanctions although the underlying reason (e.g., 
impairment of capital or/and liquidity or/and asset quality, etc.) for these sanctions lies at the 
core of bank safety and soundness. Moreover, banks exposed to class 1 sanctions remain quite 
unstable afterwards (i.e., the volatility of returns and the risk of insolvency remain at high 
levels). We also infer that class 2 sanctions tend to be applied in a timely fashion and to exert 
their disciplinary impact much more smoothly in the sense that they do not impair any of the 
bank fundamentals examined. As for class 3 sanctions, it appears that they do not significantly 
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affect the risk strategy of the banks involved, one of the reasons being that this type of sanction 
is more faintly related to the core of bank safety and soundness. We conclude that supervisors 
should place timely emphasis on those fields of misconduct covered by class 2 sanctions as this 
is likely to allow the early detection and tackling of the root causes of much more serious 
problems at their inception, without prejudicing bank fundamentals.  
 Section 2 reviews the literature and further highlights the importance of the present 
study in identifying the impact of enforcement actions on bank capital, risk, and performance. 
Section 3 discusses how the dataset for the present study is constructed, with an emphasis on 
enforcement actions. Section 4 presents the empirical method and analyzes the findings. Section 
5 concludes by discussing the policy implications of the findings.  
 
2. Context and related literature 
Supervisory enforcement through the application of remedial actions in case of regulatory 
violations constitutes an indispensable ingredient of a credible institutional framework 
governing the operation of banks (e.g., Mishkin, 2000; Black, 2001). Quite surprisingly, 
however, empirical research exploring the nexus between supervisory enforcement actions and 
bank behavior has been scarce, to say the least.  
To the best of our knowledge, pending the present paper, no research has gathered raw 
data on enforcement actions by all three U.S. bank supervisors (FDIC, OCC, FRB) and assessed 
their correlation with bank behavior after taking into account their classification according to 
the underlying rationale and their relevance to bank safety and soundness. The latter 
classification is crucial in determining which types of sanctions are the most effective in 
promoting prudent banking practices.  
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The seeds of the discussion can be traced back to the 1991 U.S. General Accounting 
Office Report on bank supervision, which concludes, from the elaboration of a small sample of 
72 formal enforcement actions, that employing the most forceful actions leads to better 
outcomes in both capital improvement and correcting the causes of capital depletion (U.S. 
GAO, 1991). In contrast, Peek and Rosengren (1995) suggest that the formal enforcement 
actions imposed on New England banks between 1989-1993 by the FDIC and the OCC resulted 
in the shrinkage of loan portfolios and bank lending rather than in capital increases. A FDIC 
survey (1997) of the FDIC and FRB formal enforcement actions for the period 1980-1994 infers 
that such actions do affect bank behavior; that is, they cause asset growth decline, dividend rate 
reductions, and increases in external capital infusions. Using data on FDIC enforcement actions 
for the period 1980-1996, Curry et al. (1999) find that formal enforcement actions have a more 
significant impact on areas over which bank management has a high degree of control (i.e., the 
rates of both loan-loss provisioning and net loan charge-offs increase, and cash dividend 
distributions decrease) as opposed to areas where external factors play a greater role (e.g., 
external capital injections and asset growth). Along the same line, the theoretical models of 
Milne (2002) and Furfine (2001) conclude that the threat of sanctions forces banks to reduce 
their portfolio risk. Finally, and more relevant to the present work, Delis and Staikouras (2011) 
build a new panel dataset with information on on-site audits and sanctions for 17 countries over 
the period 1998-2008 and infer a linear and negative relation between sanctions and bank risk. 
However, this analysis utilizes the aggregate number of sanctions (at the country level) on a 
yearly basis and, thus, does not exploit the full information on the impact of sanctions on 
individual banks. 
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Our work could also be placed within the broader literature assessing the relationship 
between “supervisory quality effectiveness” and bank behavior.1 Kaufman (1995) and Swindle 
(1995) were among the first to acknowledge that increased supervisory pressure, as approached 
by the introduction of the prompt corrective action policy and the use of CAMEL ratings, 
constrains the behavior of undercapitalized banks. Since then, related research has employed 
various proxies for “supervisory quality effectiveness” (e.g., supervisory power and 
independence) and has reached mixed inferences regarding the latter’s impact on bank 
performance, soundness, and stability (e.g., Barth et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2006; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2011). The measures used by this strand of literature determine 
“supervisory quality” in an indirect manner. This is so because they focus on law on the books 
vis-à-vis actual implementation, or/and build upon the subjective judgment of respondents to 
questionnaires, or/and use a benchmark (e.g., Basel Core Principles) with an inherently broad 
content (see also Delis and Staikouras, 2011). 
 However, none of the above studies utilize the full range of enforcement actions by all 
supervisory agencies to infer the impact of these sanctions on a series of bank fundamentals at 
the bank level. Further, the relevant literature so far does not make a distinction based on the 
different bearing that diverse types of sanction may have on bank safety and soundness, thus 
missing important insights as to the most effective type of remedial action needed to induce 
bank discipline. The present study aims to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 From an even wider perspective, our work may be associated with the line of research inferring a negative 
correlation between stock prices and disclosure of enforcement actions (e.g., Brous and Leggett, 1996; Jordan et 
al., 1999; Slovin et al., 1999) and the strand of literature that finds no evidence of unusual deposit withdrawals or 
spread increases following the announcement of formal actions (e.g., Gilbert and Vaughan, 2001). 
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3. Data 
In this section we discuss the data used in the empirical analysis, placing the spotlight on the 
novel sample of enforcement actions and their categorization. Subsequently, we discuss in some 
detail the bank-level response variables and provide a brief note on the control variables in our 
study. 
 
3.1. Enforcement actions 
We start with data on all formal enforcement actions that have been enacted by the three main 
U.S. banking supervisory authorities (FDIC, OCC, and FRB) in the period 2000Q1-2010Q4. 
Specifically, our sample encompasses: (1) involuntary terminations of insurance, (2) cease and 
desist orders, (3) written agreements, (4) suspension, removal, and prohibition orders, (5) 
section 19 letters, (6) civil money penalties, including Call Report penalties, (7) criminal 
penalties, (8) prompt corrective action directives, (9) safety and soundness orders, (10) capital 
directives, (11) termination of Federal Reserve System membership orders, (12) regulation Z 
orders, (13) restitution orders, and (14) revocations of license and placements in 
conservatorship/ receivership.2 This is a new hand-collected dataset with a total number of 
6,177 sanctions imposed on banks located in the United States.3 We exclude from our sample 
the supervisory decisions that do not contain some kind of reprimand for violation of laws 
and/or regulations (e.g., modification/termination of prohibition orders, denial of acquisition of 
                                                 
2
 See 12 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) §§ 1817(a), 1818, 1829, 1831O, 1831P-1, 2801, and 3907, as well as 12 CFR (Code of 
Federal Regulations) §§ 3 and 167. For a more detailed explanation for each type of sanction, see:  
(i) http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/edoaction.html,  
(ii) http://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-regulations/enforcement-actions/enforcement-actions-types.html, and 
(iii) http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/supervision_cbem.htm.   
3
 Our analysis does not include federal savings associations (thrifts).  
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control, voluntary termination of insurance, interlocutory reviews, termination of cease and 
desist orders, etc).  
We examine the information on these actions from the U.S. banking supervisory 
authorities’ websites on a one-by-one basis and look into their underlying rationale. On the 
basis of their raison d'être and relevance for bank safety and soundness, we then break down 
formal enforcement actions into four classes. As displayed in the Appendix, Class 1 
encompasses those actions that are at the core of bank safety and soundness, whereas class 4 
comprises those actions that are rather unrelated to bank safety and soundness. 
Class 1 encompasses actions that have been taken for violations of the requirements 
concerning banks’ financial soundness (e.g., capital adequacy and liquidity, asset quality, 
provisions and reserves, large exposures, and exposures to related parties). Class 2 comprises 
actions that have been taken for violations of the requirements regarding banks’ internal 
organization (e.g., internal control and audit systems, including risk management systems, as 
well as money laundering, bank secrecy, consumer compliance programs, and foreign assets 
control). Hence, we generate a separate category from class 1 actions to differentiate between 
sanctions imposed for breaches of financial soundness vis-à-vis those concerning the 
organizational requirements of banks. Class 3 includes actions that have been imposed for 
breaches of the requirements concerning the fitness and propriety of banks’ board members and 
senior management, as well as other persons closely connected with banks (institution-affiliated 
parties). Finally, class 4 encompasses actions that have been taken for residual and, as such, 
heterogeneous reasons; i.e., they refer to typical infringements of various laws (e.g., Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), Flood Insurance Act (FIA), Flood Disaster Protection Act 
(FDPA), Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), and Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)). 
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By extension, class 4 sanctions are rather unrelated to bank safety and soundness. For precisely 
this reason, we only report the evolution of our response variables for class 4 sanctions but do 
not discuss any policy implications.  
 In the next step, we match the name, city, and state of each bank exposed to enforcement 
actions with the relevant accounting data from the commercial bank and bank holding company 
Call Reports (FFIEC 031/041 and Y-9C Call Reports, respectively). If there is any discrepancy 
between the information provided in the reports of sanctions and in the Call Reports, we drop 
the relevant observation. Because the Call Report data are available on a quarterly basis, we 
match the sanctions’ effective dates with the relevant quarters. For example, all sanctions 
effective from January 1st to March 31st are matched with the first quarter of that year. 
Whenever two enforcement actions of different classes that are imposed on a single bank 
become effective in the same quarter, or where the same supervisory decision contains sanctions 
belonging in more than one class, we keep only the enforcement action of the higher class. This 
choice is justified as the effect of the most important (for bank safety and soundness) 
enforcement action outshines that of the less important one. All the above steps reduce our 
dataset to 4,294 enforcement actions. Further, due to Call Report data availability constraints, 
our final working sample contains 3,688 enforcement actions imposed on 2,658 distinct banks 
(i.e., more than one action has been imposed on some banks over the period examined). Of 
these banks, 2,475 are commercial banks and 183 are bank holding companies.  
Table 1 provides (1) descriptive statistics for the number of enforcement actions per year 
and per regulator (Panel A) and (2) a classification according to the type of these actions (Panel 
B). In Panel A, the columns correspond to the supervisory authorities, and the rows to the years 
of the sample. As the figures in Panel A show, the number of sanctions originating from all 
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three supervisors rises sharply after 2008, indicating the heavy toll that the financial crisis took 
on banks. However, this also shows, although speculatively, that the supervisors did not quite 
foresee the seeds of the crisis and did not react proactively. Panel B shows that class 1 sanctions 
constitute the largest group (about 47% of the total sanctions in the sample), whereas sanctions 
of type 2 constitute the smallest group. 
    
3.2. Response variables 
We examine the impact of enforcement actions on a battery of response variables during a time 
window of (-4, +4) quarters around the sanction quarter. We use an unbalanced panel dataset 
that includes all U.S. banks, both those exposed and those not exposed to sanctions. In doing 
this, the banks exposed to sanctions serve as the treatment group, and those not exposed to 
sanctions as the control group. Because we use a time window around the event, we employ the 
accounting data for the period 1999Q1 – 2011Q4 (i.e., we extend our 2000Q1-2010Q4 panel by 
one year at each end).  
  We use a number of response variables that characterize the capital, risk, and 
performance of banks. We provide exact definitions for these variables in Table 2. All of these 
variables are from the Call Reports. The first variable is the total risk-based capital ratio. We 
complement this ratio with its decomposition, i.e., the equivalent ratios for Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital. The three ratios are the most widely used by researchers and supervisors to assess the 
level of bank capital as a fraction of the risk-weighted assets. A higher value for these ratios, 
especially for the first two, reflects a higher degree of capitalization and a lower probability of 
insolvency. 
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 To identify whether sanctions have an impact on capital or whether they affect the 
riskiness of the bank portfolio, we also examine the response of the risk-weighted assets ratio 
(i.e., the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets). In doing this, we examine whether, 
following the sanction, banks decide to shrink their risky assets instead of raising capital so as 
to increase their risk-weighted capital base. A change in this ratio would reveal a change in the 
riskiness of bank assets following the sanction.  
 The final tests involve the impact of enforcement actions on the risk-related bank 
performance. The simplest measure of performance is bank profitability, which is usually 
measured by the ratio of total profits before tax to total assets (ROA). We complement this 
basic ratio with the standard deviation of bank profits over a period of 12 quarters and the Z-
score (explicit definitions are provided in Table 2). These measures reflect both performance 
and the probability of default and are used quite frequently in the related banking literature (e.g., 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Delis and Staikouras, 2011).  
 
3.3. Control variables 
An analysis of the impact of sanctions on the bank fundamentals discussed in the previous 
subsection, using conventional regression techniques, requires the use of some control variables 
to avoid the omitted-variables problem. We start with a large number of bank characteristics 
pertaining to liquidity, provisions, problem loans, and the availability of deposits. Many of these 
characteristics have been shown to have a significant impact on bank capital, risk, and 
performance measures in the banking literature (e.g., Boyd et al., 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 
2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2008). We enhance these measures with variables like bank size 
and the mix of interest and noninterest income. 
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 After carrying out a number of initial regressions, and using a large number of potential 
control variables, we resort to the following controls (explicit definitions are provided in Table 
2). To measure bank liquidity, we use the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. In our setting, 
liquid assets include cash and balances due from depository institutions plus the fair value of 
held-to-maturity U.S. Treasury securities. We include the U.S. Treasury securities as these are 
short-term securities that are very easily liquidated. As a proxy for provisions for loan losses, 
we use the ratio of the allowance for loan and lease losses over the total loans and leases that are 
net of unearned income. Besides the provisions for loan losses, we also control for the actual 
loan losses, using the ratio of nonaccrual to total loans and leases, net of unearned income. 
Further, we control for potential changes in the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet by 
using the simple ratio of total deposits to total assets. Finally, we control for bank size and 
noninterest income by using the log of total assets and the ratio of noninterest income to total 
income, respectively. We further control for some of our response variables, discussed in 
Section 3.2, where these variables are not used as dependent variables in the estimated 
equations. All the bank-level variables are from the Call Reports.  
 Besides these bank characteristics, we experiment with many structural and 
macroeconomic variables that may drive our results. In our final regressions, we include three 
variables common to all banks. The first is the industry’s median of the dependent variable, 
where “industry” refers to all banks operating in the United States for which the Call Reports 
provide data for each quarter.4 We simply call this variable “median of dependent variable.” We 
use this variable to capture potential trends in the behavior of all U.S. banks. In doing so, we 
avoid attributing these trends to the impact of the sanctions on the dependent variables. We 
                                                 
4
 We calculate the median for commercial banks and bank holding companies separately and use the relevant 
measure for the respective bank (cross section) in the panel regressions. 
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further discuss this issue in the econometric methodology that follows. The second variable is 
the federal funds rate, which shows the direction of the Central Bank rate and, as such, the 
perception of the Fed concerning the state of the macroeconomic environment. The third is the 
real GDP growth rate (year-on-year), which accounts for the impact of fluctuations in economic 
activity on the response variables. The last two variables are obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. 
 
4. Methodology and results 
This section analyzes the empirical methodology and the findings concerning the impact of 
enforcement actions on the banking fundamentals discussed in Section 3. Before we proceed 
with estimations, and given the richness of the dataset, it is worth visualizing in simple graphs 
the behavior of our response variables following the sanction. In Figures 1a to 1g, we present 
the fluctuations in our response variables in the eight quarters before and after the sanction, 
along with the fluctuations of the respective medians for all banks. We include all types of 
sanctions in these figures, with the dashed vertical line indicating the time the sanction is 
enacted. 
 A quite interesting story emerges right away. As Figures 1a and 1b show, the falling 
trend in important variables, such as the risk-based capital ratio and the Tier 1 capital ratio, 
reverses approximately two quarters before the enactment of the sanction. This may be due to 
the fact that banks react to their falling capital ratios through a self-discipline mechanism 
(FDIC, 1997). Alternatively, and considering that enforcement actions are generally enacted 
after a supervisory audit, banks may react proactively because of two reasons. The first is 
simply because they anticipate the sanction; the second is because formal enforcement actions 
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may take some time to draft, negotiate, and execute, and this gives banks the time to take 
corrective action (FDIC, 1997; Brunmeier and Willardson, 2006). In contrast, the Tier 2 capital 
ratio (Figure 1c) increases to well above the industry’s median in the period before the sanction. 
This shows that troubled banks try to maintain capital levels by raising supplementary capital 
constituents, such as undisclosed reserves, general provisions, and/or subordinated debt.   
Figure 1d reflects one of the most interesting patterns. The banks exposed to 
enforcement actions have a very high risk-weighted assets ratio well before the sanction is 
imposed. This ratio starts collapsing about two or three quarters before the sanction. Bearing in 
mind the supervisory emphasis on asset quality in the context of the Uniform Financial 
Institutions Rating System (UFIRS),5 the imposition of enforcement actions should come as no 
surprise for banks maintaining a comparatively risky portfolio. However, this graph also shows 
that these very risky banks may not have been exposed to enforcement actions on a timely basis; 
that is, supervisory response should have been triggered approximately one year earlier. 
Moreover, the decline in the risk-weighted assets ratio has important implications for 
bank profitability and the risk of insolvency. Figures 1e to 1g illustrate the return on assets 
(ROA), the volatility of the ROA, and the Z-score around the event of the sanction. The 
respective medians for these three variables are relatively stable, whereas the variables 
reflecting the behavior of the banks exposed to enforcement actions fluctuate significantly. In 
particular, the ROA and the Z-score of the banks exposed to enforcement actions start 
collapsing about two years before the enforcement action, whereas the volatility of the ROA 
increases significantly. Evidently, the enforcement action finds these banks in almost their worst 
                                                 
5
 Under the UFIRS, each bank is assigned a composite rating based on the supervisory evaluation of six financial 
and operational components, which are also rated. The component ratings reflect the bank’s capital adequacy, asset 
quality, management capabilities, earnings sufficiency, liquidity position, and sensitivity to market risk (commonly 
referred to as CAMELS ratings). 
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shape. After the event, the ROA and the Z-score seem to somewhat stabilize, but the banks do 
remain highly risky by industry standards.  
The figures discussed above already provide a qualitative analysis of our findings but 
tell us very little about the statistical significance of the observed changes or about the 
differential effect of the diverse classes of sanctions. To quantify these fluctuations and provide 
deeper insights, we resort to two different techniques. First, we set out our findings in tandem 
with a brief discussion regarding the impact of total enforcement actions where appropriate. 
Subsequently, Section 5 presents a more composite analysis of the findings, along with the 
associated policy implications, placing special emphasis on the effect of the different sanction 
classes on the response variables.  
  
4.1. Univariate tests 
We first look at the impact of enforcement actions on the capital, risk, and performance of those 
banks exposed to enforcement actions using univariate tests. This methodology, also employed 
in several other recent event studies (e.g., Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Norden and Weber, 
2010; Baek et al., 2011), has the advantage of simplicity and transparency regarding the 
possible effect of a sanction on the response variables. More specifically, we look at the impact 
of sanctions on the response variables described in Section 3.2 before and after the sanction 
quarter. For each sanction, we calculate the averages of the response variable for the periods (t-
4) to (t-1) and (t+1) to (t+4), where t is the sanction quarter. The two periods capture the 
average behavior of the response variable one year before and one year after the sanction, 
respectively. In this way, we also deal with seasonality in the financial accounting data, which 
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may influence the results. Subsequently, we compare the means of these averages across 
sanctions.  
Here, we use only those cases where the sanction at time t is the only one imposed 
during the (-4, +4) quarters. Under this restriction, the choice of the event window of (-4, +4) 
quarters, as opposed to (-8, +8) quarters in the graphs discussed above, is justified for three 
reasons. First, it reduces the possibility that any change in the response variable could be 
attributed to events other than the sanction, especially for the cases after the eruption of the 
crisis in 2008. Further robustness checks on this issue are presented later in this paper. Second, 
it heavily increases the number of observations for the univariate tests, relative to a choice of a 
wider event window of, say, (-8, +8) quarters. Third, it minimizes the possibility of survivorship 
bias, which could affect the results. 
 Table 3 reports the results of the univariate tests for changes in the capital, risk, and 
performance of banks around the quarter the sanction is imposed. For these initial tests, we use 
all types of enforcement actions. The most interesting column is the one reporting the difference 
between the averages of the relevant response variables before and after the sanction is imposed.  
 Panel A shows that the differences in the two main variables reflecting the capitalization 
of banks (the first two ratios) are positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. More 
specifically, the risk-based capital ratio increases by 0.42 basis points on average (from 0.1455 
to 0.1497) for the bank exposed to enforcement actions within one year after the event. The 
equivalent increase for the Tier 1 ratio is 0.40 basis points. The Tier 2 capital ratio also 
increases; however, the economic significance of this increase is relatively low. Overall, these 
findings are in line with the data in Figures 1a to 1c, but the univariate tests show that these 
changes are only marginally statistically significant.  
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The most significant fluctuations in banking fundamentals concern the risk-weighted 
assets and performance. Specifically, as the results in Panel B of Table 3 show, a sanction 
reduces significantly and within one year the risk-weighted assets ratio of the average bank 
exposed to the sanction from about 0.732 to about 0.707, which is a considerable decrease for 
such a small period of time. As shown in the equations with the ROA as the response variable, 
the enforcement action lowers the profitability of the involved banks. Specifically, the mean 
ROA of banks exposed to enforcement actions before the event is approximately 0.0015; the 
value falls to zero after the sanction, indicating that banks exposed to enforcement actions incur 
significant losses during the time period around the enactment of the sanction. This also extends 
to increased fluctuations in profitability and higher insolvency risk. Evidently, the risk of 
insolvency, as measured by the Z-score, is approximately 0.105 points higher on average (i.e., 
the Z-score is lower) in the first year after the sanction as compared to the year before the 
sanction. This results from the fluctuations in both the ROA and its volatility (σROA). 
In the results presented in Table 4, we distinguish between the different classes of 
enforcement actions. As expected, the strongest results are related to class 1 sanctions, whereas 
enforcement actions of classes 2 to 4 do not seem to have a strong effect on our response 
variables. In particular, Column I shows a very similar story to the one presented in Table 3. 
The new element is that most of the responses on bank fundamentals are larger and more 
significant. The increase in the three risk-based capital variables is now statistically significant 
at the 5% level, and the change is larger. Specifically, the risk-based capital ratio increases by 
0.7 points following the enactment of the sanction as opposed to the 0.4-point increase reported 
in Table 3. In addition, sanctions of class 1 take a very heavy toll on the risk- and performance-
related variables. The risk-weighted assets ratio falls by approximately 4.7% within one year, 
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which is a very large decrease. Further, the ROA, which is already in negative territory for the 
banks exposed to a class 1 sanction, falls by an additional 0.26 points, whereas the Z-score 
declines by approximately 9.8% within a single year.  
Overall, the findings in Table 4 show that enforcement actions of class 1 lead to quite 
large fluctuations in bank fundamentals as opposed to the other types of sanctions. For sanctions 
of classes 2 to 4, almost all the univariate statistics show that the changes in our response 
variables are statistically insignificant (see Columns II-IV).  
 
4.2. Panel regression analysis 
The univariate tests described above, although straightforward, can be criticized on the basis of 
their not explicitly taking into account other forces, common and/or idiosyncratic, that may 
drive the results. This is a standard omitted-variables problem that could lead to falsely 
attributing the behavior of the response variable to the event, while the behavior actually results 
from fluctuations in omitted variables. Given this consideration, we employ a panel fixed 
effects model of the form: 
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    (1) 
In equation (1) y is the response variable for bank i at time t, and τ is the time when the 
sanction (event) is enacted on the ith bank. Four dummy variables termed Sanction enter the 
main estimated equations. The first equals one for the quarters τ-4 and τ-3 for the bank that was 
exposed to the sanction at τ. The second equals one for the quarters τ-2 and τ-1, the third equals 
one for the quarter of the event τ, and the fourth equals one for the quarters τ+1 to τ+4. The 
reason for this differentiation is the behavior of the bank fundamentals shown in the figures 
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above, where some of the response variables (e.g., the capital ratios) react prior to the enactment 
of the sanction. In other words, our modeling choice should reflect, through the relevant 
coefficient estimates of the dummy variables, the full-time path of the changes in the response 
variables due to enforcement actions. Common is a vector of the three structural and 
macroeconomic variables described in Section 3.3, and Bank the vector of the bank-specific 
variables. Both enter the equation lagged once. Finally, v refers to bank fixed effects, e to the 
quarter (time) fixed effects, and u to the remainder disturbance.    
Equation (1) is estimated with OLS and robust standard errors clustered by bank. We 
infer the effect of the sanction on bank fundamentals from simple Wald tests of equality of the 
forms β4 – (β1 + β2)/2 = 0, β4 – β1 = 0, β4 – β2 = 0, and β2 – β1 = 0. These tests reveal the change 
in the response variables between the relevant periods before and after the sanction. We first 
look into all types of enforcement actions and, subsequently, differentiate between the four 
classes. 
 
4.2.1. Results for all classes of enforcement actions  
In Table 5 we report the estimation results for all classes of sanctions and for the full sample of 
sanction cases to avoid introducing selectivity bias. The results reported only partially confirm 
the findings from the figures and univariate tests. The most significant difference compared to 
the findings reported in the figures and univariate tests concerns the estimated coefficients of 
the capital ratios (see Columns I-III). The responses in these ratios are now negative and 
statistically significant even at the 1% level, denoting that capital ratios actually fall in the year 
after the sanction. These results illustrate the importance of controlling for other variables in our 
empirical analysis. In particular, the main driving force of the negative sign comes from the 
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inclusion of time effects in our model, which shows that capital ratios are sensitive to systemic 
ongoing events that affect the banking system. However, we should note that the risk-based 
capital ratio of the average bank exposed to enforcement actions falls by approximately 0.5 
basis points (see first row of Panel B in Column I), which is not a very large decrease in 
absolute economic terms. Moreover, it seems that the risk-based capital ratio does not fall 
analogously to the risk-weighted assets ratio decline reported below, which implies that banks 
are cautious not to allow a depletion of their capital matching the risk-weighted assets ratio 
cutback. Clearly, because the risk-weighted assets are, by definition, lower than the total assets 
of the bank, a drop in the risk-weighted assets ratio should cause a larger drop in the risk-based 
capital ratio (where risk-weighted assets is the denominator) in case there is a one-to-one match 
between a depletion of capital and the reduction in risk-weighted assets.  
The changes in the other response variables appear to be consistent with the changes 
reported in the respective figures and univariate tests. The risk-weighted assets ratio falls by 
approximately 0.75% on average in the year after the sanction compared to the year before the 
sanction (see first row of Panel B in Column IV). This implies that for a bank with $100,000 
initial worth of such assets, for example, the sanction will decrease this value by $750 within 
four quarters, which does not seem to be a very large effect in economic terms. The ROA 
increases by a small percentage from the period just before the sanction (quarters -1 and -2) to 
the period after the sanction (see third row of Panel B in Column V). Statistical significance is 
also observed for the effect of the sanction on the Z-score. Between the year before the sanction 
and the year after the sanction (see first row of panel B in Column VII), the natural logarithm of 
the Z-score falls by approximately 0.06 points or by 2.4% for the average bank exposed to 
enforcement actions (if one considers that the average Z-score of the banks exposed to 
22 
 
enforcement actions is 2.51). This is approximately half the effect found in the univariate tests, 
reflecting once again the importance of including control variables.  
A potential concern is the possible presence of endogeneity in the model. Our model 
controls for common effects, but another type of endogeneity could also be present. Intuitively, 
a sanction is usually imposed on banks with deteriorating risk-weighted capital, overly risk-
taking behavior, and/or unstable performance. Note, however, that in our setting, even if the 
residuals are correlated with the Sanction dummies, our focus is on the Wald test of equality 
between the pairs of coefficients given above. Given that the endogeneity bias in β1, β3, and β4, 
if any, would be in the same direction and approximately of the same order (as the dummies are 
included to capture the same event), the bias in the differences between the three coefficients 
should be relatively low; i.e., the biases will cancel out at least to some extent (see, for example, 
the discussion in Kyriazidou, 1997). To verify that this is indeed the case, we additionally use 
instrumental variables regression as a robustness check.  
In particular, we employ a treatment effects model, which is suitable in our case because 
the endogenous variables (the sanction dummies) are binary variables. For the estimation we 
use full information maximum likelihood and confirm that the results do not change if we use 
the two-step estimator. The choice for an instrumental variable was not an easy one. We resort 
to the use of a dummy variable, named “opendummy,” which takes a value of one for the 
quarters 5 to 20 after the (average) quarter during which there is an opening of a new branch for 
the relevant bank. We do not include the first four quarters to avoid associating the opening of a 
new branch to bank fundamentals. In this way, we implicitly assume that a bank that has been 
expanding its business over some time has increased probability of breaching the law-on-the-
books due to changes in its operational structure, whereas the opening of a branch does not have 
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a direct effect on the fundamentals of the banking firm. The first stage probit results (reported in 
Panel B of Table 6) show that there is indeed a strong correlation between opendummy and the 
sanction dummy. Using simple OLS panel data regressions with fixed and time effects (results 
available on request), we also confirm that opendummy is not strongly correlated with any of 
our response variables.6  
We replicate Table 5 using the treatment effects model and report the results in Table 6. 
The results shown in the two tables, especially those concerning the statistical significance of 
the Wald tests, are very similar. The economic significance of the differences changes 
marginally. For example, the risk-weighted assets ratio seems to decrease by 2.05%, which is 
higher than the 0.75% decline reported in Table 5. However, the trends in bank fundamentals 
observed in the Wald tests, and shown in Panel C of Table 6, coincide with those presented in 
Panel B of Table 5. We confirm that this is the case for the rest of the sensitivity analyses and 
for the analysis of the different classes of sanctions reported below. Thus, and because we are 
primarily concerned about the trends in our response variables, we conclude that the OLS and 
the treatment effects models produce similar results, and we resort to the computationally 
simpler and asymptotically more-efficient OLS estimator for the rest of the regressions reported 
below.7   
                                                 
6
 One could suggest that conceptually, and although we do not find a strong statistical correlation between our 
response variables and opendummy, the opening of a new branch would affect the bank fundamentals for a period 
longer than one year. On this front, the recent work of Nevo and Rosen (2012) shows that identification with 
imperfect instruments is feasible as long as (i) the correlation between the instrumental variable and the error term 
has the same sign as the correlation between the endogenous regressor and the error term, and (ii) the correlation 
between the endogenous explanatory variable and the instrument is higher than the respective correlation between 
the instrument and the error term. This is indeed the case in our setting. We also experimented with other 
instruments, such as the opendummy with aces in the periods -13 to -20, the fourth lag of the salaries expenses as a 
share of total expenses, the fourth lag of real GDP growth, the fourth lag of the median Tier 1 risk-based capital 
ratio, and the fourth lag of the median noninterest income. When the set of instrumental variables passes the 
requirements set above, the results of the treatment effects model are essentially unchanged. 
7
 We also confirm that the results reported in the rest of the tables below are similar to those produced by the 
treatment effects model. 
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As a further sensitivity analysis, we run the regressions reported in Table 5 for the cases 
where the time window of (-4, +4) quarters for bank i is clean of any other enforcement action 
besides that imposed on this bank in the event’s quarter at τ. In other words, we keep only those 
cases where the sanction at τ is the only one imposed on those particular banks during the (-4, 
+4) quarters. This exclusion yields 2,420 enforcement actions, down from the 3,688 in the 
original sample. Table 7 shows the results of this exercise.8 We observe that the changes in the 
results are minimal compared to those reported in Table 5 and that all the main implications 
carry through when using the clean time window.9  
We carry out two more robustness checks. First, we consider separate subsamples for 
the periods before and after 2008 and find that the policy implications discussed below remain 
essentially the same, which indicates that the financial crisis did not change the effect of 
enforcement actions on bank fundamentals. Second, by using another subsample, we ensure that 
causality runs from enforcement actions only and cannot be attributed to other firm-specific 
corporate events that may coincide with the imposition of a sanction. In this subsample, we 
exclude from the analysis cases such as mergers, either as an acquirer or a target, liquidations, 
and failures that took place within a time frame of one and a half years around the enforcement 
action. This subsample contains 3,011 sanction cases, i.e., 677 fewer cases than in the main 
working sample of 3,688 cases. We also exclude banks that participated in the TARP program 
after 2008. Once again the results remain unchanged. Owing to space considerations, we do not 
report the results of the last two sensitivity analyses (available on request). 
                                                 
8
 Due to space considerations, we do not report the coefficient estimates of the control variables from this point 
onward or the Wald tests for the changes β4 – β1 = 0, β4 – β2 = 0, and β2 – β1 = 0. These estimates are available 
on request. 
9
 We also conducted this analysis for the period (-8, +8) quarters event window for the cases where the event 
window is clean of any other enforcement action besides that imposed on this bank in the event’s quarter at τ. The 
results remain essentially the same.  
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4.4.2. Results for the different classes of enforcement actions 
Table 8 confirms the finding from the univariate tests that the most significant changes in bank 
fundamentals come from class 1 sanctions. The statistical and economic significance of 
virtually all the coefficient estimates on the Wald tests show once again the stronger effect of 
class 1 sanctions compared to the equivalent estimates in Table 5. Most notably, the Wald tests 
reported in Panel B of Table 8 show that the changes in the risk-weighted assets, the volatility 
of the ROA, and the Z-score are very large for banks exposed to a class 1 sanction.  
 Table 8 also reports the results concerning the impact of types 2, 3, and 4 enforcement 
actions on bank fundamentals. In general, the results show that the impact of these types of 
sanctions on several response variables is not statistically significant. This includes the response 
of variables that showed significant variability for sanctions of class 1, such as the risk-
weighted assets ratio, the ROA, and the Z-score.  
Because the results of the econometric analysis and the figures seem to qualitatively 
coincide for the risk-weighted assets and the risk of insolvency variables, the discussion of the 
relevant policy considerations may develop by looking into the evolution of the main bank 
fundamentals by class of sanction and with respect to the median of the industry. Figure 2 
presents this evolution for the risk-weighted assets ratio and the Z-score for the first three 
classes of enforcement actions relative to the median of the industry in the eight quarters before 
and after the sanction. We believe that the graphs shed ample light onto the relative effect of 
sanctions of class 1 versus sanctions of the other classes.  
Figure 2a shows that the average risk-weighted asset ratio of banks that receive a class 2 
sanction is quite lower than those of banks exposed to a class 1 sanction and somewhat higher 
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than the median of the industry. Further, it appears that class 2 sanctions are imposed at a time 
when the risk-weighted assets ratio peaks and that, after the sanction, the risk-weighted assets 
ratio falls and converges with the industry’s median. As far as class 3 sanctions are concerned, it 
seems that supervisory intervention does not affect the slightly upward trend of the risk-
weighted assets ratio, which had started to develop before the application of those enforcement 
actions.  
Figure 2b illustrates approximately the same story. In the pre-sanction period, all banks 
that were subsequently exposed to enforcement actions have Z-scores below the median, but 
those that received a class 1 sanction seem to be in a considerably more strenuous position. 
Notably, the Z-score of banks that got sanctions other that class 1, and especially of those banks 
that got class 2 sanctions, is lower than the median of the industry two years before the sanction 
and at a level approximately equal to that of banks that got a class 1 sanction. However, the Z-
score of banks that got a class 2 sanction deteriorates at a much lower pace. When the sanction 
emerges, the Z-score of banks exposed to class 2 sanctions initially falls but starts converging 
with the industry’s median from quarter +2 onward. Akin to the trend of their risk-weighted 
assets ratio, the Z-score of banks exposed to class 3 sanctions appears unaffected and continues 
its somehow upward trend, which had commenced before the imposition of sanctions. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The underlying implications of the results may provide instructive guidance concerning the 
shaping of bank supervisors’ enforcement and audit policy.  
To begin with, timely supervisory intervention is of essence in developing an effective 
enforcement policy. Considering the trend of the response variables for banks exposed to 
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enforcement actions vis-à-vis the industry average during the period preceding the imposition of 
sanctions, it appears that the supervisory reaction in imposing enforcement actions whose 
rationale lies at the core of bank safety and soundness (i.e., class 1) came too late. To the 
obvious question of why the supervisors responded late, the supervisory forbearance literature 
offers more than one plausible explanation (e.g., Kane, 1989; Gilbert, 1991; Kroszner, 2000; 
Garcia, 2010). First, supervisors may be captured by regulated banks to serve the latter’s private 
interest as opposed to the public interest, or they may enjoy wide discretionary powers so that 
they can manipulate the timing of enforcement actions without incurring liability. Second, 
supervisors may be incited to delay detecting banking irregularities to avoid taking costly action 
and passing on the “hot potato” to future supervisors, or they may postpone the application of 
formal enforcement actions due to the prior application and monitoring of informal actions. 
Finally, supervisors may abstain from criticizing banks during boom periods or may delay their 
response as a result of searching for potential buyers of ailing banks. Our results add a further, 
interesting implication to the above reasoning: Contrary to what one may expect, based on pure 
safety and soundness considerations, violations underlying class 1 sanctions, due to their gravity 
and the severity of enforcement actions that they may trigger, could increase pressure on 
supervisors to adopt a more lax attitude. Put in a different way, supervisory alertness may be 
missing when it is most needed, precisely because it is when financial distress becomes exposed 
that forces toward forbearance also become stronger.    
Turning to the impact of the different classes of enforcement actions on our response 
variables, it appears that class 1 sanctions do not improve the bank risk profile. Both the risk-
based capital ratio and the risk-weighted assets ratio decrease. This implies that although the 
reshuffling of the asset portfolio leads to a heavy overall decline in the risk-weighted assets 
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ratio, banks appear somehow prudent not to allow a corresponding depletion of their capital. On 
the other hand, the cost paid for such a serious plummet in the risk-weighted assets ratio is the 
increased volatility of returns and an increase in insolvency risk. All in all, therefore, our 
findings suggest that banks getting class 1 sanctions remain pretty risky.10    
From the standpoint of statistical significance, class 2 sanctions do not appear to have a 
noteworthy impact on our response variables. Still, intriguing inferences may arise for 
supervisors and banks alike from a closer investigation of the trend of the response variables. 
Looking into our response variables before the imposition of sanctions, it emerges that banks 
exposed to class 2 sanctions are much more stable than banks of the previous class: their risk-
weighted assets and risk-based capital ratios are somehow above median, whereas their risk of 
insolvency is slightly lower than the industry average. Conceivably, these banks have developed 
and pursued a much more prudent risk strategy and, thus, have not attracted class 1 supervisory 
intervention (even in the mistimed fashion already described). Interestingly, class 2 sanctions 
appear to be well-timed, at least in terms of the bank fundamentals examined; that is, they attach 
when the risk-weighted assets ratio starts to depart from the industry median, possibly causing 
supervisory concerns. Moreover, they seem to exert their disciplinary impact much more 
smoothly in the sense that they do not impair bank fundamentals; i.e., banks’ risk-weighted 
assets ratio and risk of insolvency progressively tend to approximate the median after the event. 
  In terms of further policy considerations, our results could be extended to support that 
supervisors should place more emphasis on the area covered by class 2 enforcement actions. 
Financial ratios and other numerical indicators are lagging guides on bank safety and 
                                                 
10
 One should be mindful of the preceding discussion on the timeliness of supervisory intervention. Our 
conclusions are based on the reported empirical findings, which reflect the supervisory reaction and bank behavior 
as they occurred in reality. Hence, there is no way to identify whether it is the type of sanction per se or the timing 
of its imposition that has the most significant bearing on our inferences.      
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soundness; by contrast, effective internal control and risk management systems ensure that the 
bank is in a position to take precautionary measures by timely detecting and weathering 
excessive risks and financial adversity (Gilbert, 1993; FDIC, 1997 and 1997b). Indeed, the 
FDIC has indicated since 1997 that, among the UFIRS components, the management rating, 
which encompasses the adequacy of internal control and risk management systems, is the only 
rating element to systematically track risk factors that may produce future losses and help banks 
withstand future adversity (FDIC, 1997b). By focusing on and sanctioning internal organization 
deficiencies, supervisors would be able to identify the root causes of financial distress at an 
early stage and, therefore, to act in a preventive and much smoother manner to ensure prudent 
bank behavior (Seballos and Thomson, 1990; FDIC, 1997; Brunmeier and Willardson, 2006; 
Garcia, 2010).  
 A slightly different story emerges for class 3 sanctions against institution-affiliated 
parties, covering inter alia situations of dishonest behavior or professional incompetence. Akin 
to class 2 sanctions, it is not possible to derive a statistically significant relationship with our 
response variables. In addition, compared to the industry median, it would again be plausible to 
argue that overall, we deal with banks with a much more prudent risk profile than those exposed 
to class 1 sanctions. By examining the changes in banks’ behavior pre- and post-sanction, one 
may notice that the risk-weighted assets ratio exhibits a slight upward trend (both before and 
after the sanction), which, however, does not by any means cause concerns over banks’ risk of 
insolvency or other bank fundamentals (ROA and risk-weighted capital ratio). In other words, 
the analysis indicates that banks’ risk strategy remains unaffected, as well as that the timeliness 
of supervisory intervention is of relatively less importance than in class 1 and 2 sanctions (see 
also Brunmeier and Willardson, 2006). To explain this inference, two caveats should be kept in 
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mind. First, the underlying cause of class 3 sanctions is pretty distantly related to the core of 
bank safety and soundness (Brunmeier and Willardson, 2006) as the latter is captured by our 
response variables. Second, and most importantly, considering that the same managerial 
deficiencies and inadequate controls that are captured by class 2 sanctions are likely to also lie 
behind the development of fraud, insider abuse, or even incompetence (FDIC, 1997 and 1997b), 
it is expected that occurrences of the latter type, which pose a more serious threat to bank safety 
and soundness, have already been caught by class 2 sanctions.11  
 The present study can be expanded to analyze the response of the market to the 
enforcement actions, especially during periods of financial turmoil. Further, a more corporate 
flavor can be given if additional research identifies the interrelationship of the event of the 
sanction with other corporate events, such as M&As, which are present in our sample. As we 
have already covered a lot of ground with the response of various bank fundamentals, we leave 
the above extensions to future research. 
                                                 
11
 More generally speaking, one should be cautious not to overstretch this “seeming unresponsiveness” of banks 
toward class 3 sanctions. Indeed, dishonesty, fraud, and insider abuse have been documented as major causes of 
bank failures, including the U.S. bank and thrift failures in 1980-1994 (Graham and Homer, 1988; Seballos and 
Thomson, 1990; FDIC, 1997 and 1997b). What is more, when bank failures are caused by fraud/insider abuse, 
losses may develop quickly, and the transition from sound to insolvent condition tends to occur rapidly, leaving no 
time for other corrective action (FDIC, 1997; Brunmeier and Willardson, 2006). This is consistent with the point 
made in the main paper that class 2 sanctions also play a key role in the early tackling of internal control and risk 
management weaknesses, which may foment or facilitate the development of such serious fraud, abuse, or 
incompetence that bank safety and soundness could be threatened.   
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Table 1. Enforcement actions: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Number of enforcement actions in the sample 
according to regulator 
 FDIC OCC FRB Total 
2000 65 25 30 120 
2001 93 31 35 159 
2002 95 55 37 187 
2003 104 50 40 194 
2004 107 49 55 211 
2005 117 60 44 221 
2006 151 51 48 250 
2007 130 65 61 256 
2008 206 97 73 376 
2009 415 209 124 748 
2010 438 338 190 966 
Total 1,921 1,030 737 3,688 
 
Panel B. Number of enforcement actions in the sample 
according to class 
 Class of enforcement action 
1 2 3 4 Total 
2000 53 22 40 5 120 
2001 63 25 32 39 159 
2002 80 25 45 37 187 
2003 62 33 65 34 194 
2004 65 32 80 34 211 
2005 39 34 109 39 221 
2006 42 30 125 53 250 
2007 48 35 80 93 256 
2008 164 42 76 94 376 
2009 490 52 78 128 748 
2010 637 47 121 161 966 
Total 1,743 377 851 717 3,688 
Notes: Panel A reports the number of enforcement actions included in the working sample per 
year and per regulator for the period 2000-2010. Panel B reports the number of enforcement 
actions in the working sample according to class. These enforcement actions have been imposed 
on 2,658 different banks from which 2,475 are commercial banks and 183 are bank holding 
companies.  
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Table 2. List of variables and definitions 
Variable Definition 
 
A. Response variables  
 
Risk-based capital ratio 
 
Total qualifying capital allowable under the risk-based capital guidelines / 
risk-weighted assets (net of allowances and other deductions)) 
 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio 
 
Tier 1 capital allowable under the risk-based capital guidelines / risk-weighted 
assets (net of allowances and other deductions)) 
 
Tier 2 risk-based capital ratio 
 
Tier 2 capital allowable under the risk-based capital guidelines / risk-weighted 
assets (net of allowances and other deductions)) 
 
Risk-weighted assets ratio  
 
Risk-weighted assets (net of allowances and other deductions) / total assets 
  
Bank profits (ROA) Income or loss before income taxes and extraordinary items and other 
adjustments / total assets 
 
Standard deviation of ROA 
(STDROA) 
 
Standard deviation of ROA, calculated in a rolling 12 quarters window  
 
Z-score 
 
log[(ROA+(equity capital / total assets))/STDROA] 
 
B. Explanatory variables and 
instrumental variable 
 
Sanct 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 for the quarter during which an enforcement action 
is imposed on a bank getting a sanction and 0 otherwise 
 
Liquidity (Cash and balances due from depository institutions + fair value of held to 
maturity U.S. treasury securities) / total assets 
 
Provisions 
 
Allowance for loan and lease losses / total loans and leases  
 
Non-performing loans 
 
Total loans and lease finance receivables: nonaccrual / total loans and leases 
net of unearned income 
Bank size Log(total assets) 
Deposits ratio Total deposits / total assets 
Non-interest income Total non-interest income / (total interest income + total non-interest income) 
Median of dependent variable Cross-sectional median of all banks in each quarter of the respective dependent variable  
Federal-funds rate 
 
Effective federal funds rate; source Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and 
authors’ calculations 
Real GDP growth rate Change of the real GDP, y-o-y; source Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Opendummy 
Dummy variable equals 1 for the quarters 5 to 20 after the (average) quarter 
during which there is an opening of a new branch for the relevant bank and 0 
otherwise; source FDIC and authors' calculations.    
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Table 3. Banks subject to enforcement actions: Univariate tests for all classes of 
enforcement actions 
  
Pre quarters 
(τ-4) – (τ-1) 
Post quarters 
(τ+1) – (τ+4) 
Difference 
Post – Pre (t-stat.) 
 
A. Capital  
Risk-based capital ratio  
Mean 0.1455 0.1497 0.0042* 
St. error 0.0015 0.0017 (1.8473) 
Obs. 2,296   
Tier 1 capital ratio  
Mean 0.1330 0.1370 0.0040* 
St. error 0.0015 0.0017 (1.7517) 
Obs. 2,296   
Tier 2 capital ratio  
Mean 0.0126 0.0130 0.0004** 
St. error 0.0001 0.0001 (2.5576) 
Obs. 2,126   
 
B. Risk and performance  
Risk-weighted assets 
ratio 
Mean 0.7321 0.7071 -0.0250*** 
St. error 0.0024 0.0023 (-7.4671) 
Obs. 2,296   
ROA 
Mean 0.0015 0.0000 -0.0015*** 
St. error 0.0003 0.0004 (-3.4041) 
Obs. 2,376   
STDROA  
Mean 0.0070 0.0082 0.0012*** 
St. error 0.0001 0.0002 (5.6289) 
Obs. 2,277   
Z-score  
Mean 2.8609 2.7560 -0.1049*** 
St. error 0.0138 0.0178 (-4.6614) 
Obs. 2,079   
Notes: The table reports the univariate tests for the equality of means across sanctions 
between the average values of the respective variables on the pre-sanction quarters (τ-4) – 
(τ-1) and the post-sanction quarters (τ+1) – (τ+4) for all classes of enforcement actions 
imposed in the 2000Q1-2010Q4 period. Only those sanction cases where the sanction at 
time τ is the only one imposed during the (-4, +4) quarters are examined. For the 
differences, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Obs. denotes the number of available 
observations for each response variable. All variables are explicitly defined in Table 2. 
The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively.  
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Table 4. Banks subject to enforcement actions: Univariate tests per class of enforcement actions 
 I II III IV 
Pre  Post  Diff.  Post – Pre  Pre Post 
Diff.  
Post – Pre Pre Post 
Diff.  
Post – Pre Pre Post 
Diff.  
Post – Pre. 
A. Capital  
Risk-based 
capital ratio  
Mean 0.1347 0.1417 0.0070** 0.1708 0.1681 -0.0027 0.1508 0.1554 0.0046 0.1544 0.1550 0.0006 
St. error 0.0018 0.0027 (2.173) 0.0113 0.0065 (-0.2065) 0.0024 0.0031 (1.1559) 0.0030 0.0028 (0.1562) 
Obs. 1,103   180   444   569   
Tier 1 risk-
based capital 
ratio  
Mean 0.1217 0.1283 0.0066** 0.1577 0.1548 -0.0029 0.1387 0.1435 0.0048 0.1427 0.1432 0.0005 
St. error 0.0018 0.0027 (2.0638) 0.0113 0.0066 (-0.2185) 0.0025 0.0032 (1.1786) 0.0031 0.0028 (0.1047) 
Obs. 1,103   180   444   569   
Tier 2 risk-
based capital 
ratio  
Mean 0.0132 0.0140 0.0008*** 0.0129 0.0131 0.0002 0.0121 0.0119 -0.0002 0.0116 0.0119 0.0003 
St. error 0.0002 0.0002 (2.7751) 0.0005 0.0004 (0.3263) 0.0002 0.0002 (-0.542) 0.0002 0.0002 (1.2223) 
Obs. 1,022   160   412   532   
B. Risk and performance 
Risk-weighted 
assets ratio 
Mean 0.7520 0.7051 -0.0469*** 0.7098 0.6996 -0.0102 0.6965 0.6971 0.0006 0.7286 0.7211 -0.0075 
St. error 0.0033 0.0031 (-10.3791) 0.0095 0.0099 (-0.747) 0.0056 0.0055 (0.0783) 0.0048 0.0048 (-1.1011) 
Obs. 1,103   180   444   569   
ROA 
Mean -0.0046 -0.0072 -0.0026*** 0.0071 0.0049 -0.0022 0.0071 0.0082 0.0011 0.0068 0.0053 -0.0015** 
St. error 0.0004 0.0005 (-4.3065) 0.0015 0.0014 (-1.0805) 0.0004 0.0009 (1.0853) 0.0004 0.0006 (-2.1894) 
Obs. 1,115   202   478   581   
STDROA  
Mean 0.0079 0.0105 0.0026*** 0.0073 0.0072 -0.0001 0.0066 0.0066 0.0000 0.0054 0.0055 0.0001 
St. error 0.0002 0.0003 (8.185) 0.0008 0.0006 (-0.0461) 0.0003 0.0004 (-0.0643) 0.0002 0.0002 (0.1813) 
Obs. 1,047   191   474   565   
Z-score  
Mean 2.6228 2.3670 -0.2558*** 3.0237 2.9791 -0.0446 2.9847 3.0235 0.0388 3.1146 3.1315 0.0169 
St. error 0.0223 0.0295 (-6.9225) 0.0405 0.0530 (-0.6692) 0.0283 0.0277 (0.9812) 0.0184 0.0214 (0.5994) 
Obs. 926   168   437   548   
Notes: The table reports the univariate tests for the equality of means across sanctions between the average values of the respective variables on the pre-sanction quarters (τ-4) – 
(τ-1) and the post-sanction quarters (τ+1) – (τ+4) per class of enforcement action imposed at τ: a) class 1 in column I; b) class 2 in column II; c) class 3 in column III; d) class 4 in 
column IV. Sample period is 2000Q1 – 2010Q4. Only those sanction cases where the sanction at time τ is the only one imposed during the (-4, +4) quarters are examined. The 
differences are defined as Post – Pre, t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Obs. denotes the number of available observations. All variables are explicitly defined in Table 2. 
The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 5. Panel model: All classes of enforcement actions - all sanction cases  
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Dependent variable: Risk-based 
capital ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based 
capital ratio 
Tier 2 risk-
based capital 
ratio 
Risk-
weighted 
assets ratio 
ROA STDROA Z-score 
Panel A. Estimation results  
Intercept 1.5174*** 1.5484*** 0.0059** 0.1917*** -0.0705*** 0.0050 -0.1134 (23.2136) (31.5816) (2.2714) (4.2917) (-16.4044) (1.3549) (-0.2329) 
Sanct (-4, -3) 
0.0023** 0.0015 0.0003*** 0.0077*** -0.0024*** 0.0002* -0.0754*** 
(2.5043) (1.6013) (5.3940) (5.8709) (-11.5105) (1.6984) (-7.6244) 
Sanct (-2, -1) 
0.0000 -0.0011 0.0004*** 0.0036** -0.0040* 0.0006*** -0.1884*** 
(0.0043) (-1.1298) (5.0954) (2.5458) (-16.2740) (4.4077) (-16.0051) 
Sanct  -0.0025* -0.0033*** 0.0002** 0.0014 -0.0046*** 0.0011*** -0.2125*** (-1.8150) (-2.8677) (2.2050) (0.8662) (-14.5606) (7.2153) (-14.6836) 
Sanct (+1, +4) 
-0.0040*** -0.0041*** 0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0027*** 0.0011*** -0.1886*** 
(-3.2389) (-3.3274) (0.5406) (-1.2539) (-13.1870) (7.3740) (-15.5958) 
Median of depend. 
variable
 t-1 
-0.7031*** -1.1391*** -0.5951*** 0.3425*** 1.9528*** 2.7393*** 1.4513*** 
(-4.3413) (-8.7752) (-3.0401) (6.0303) (20.5121) (6.6572) (10.7931) 
Federal funds rate
 t-1 
-0.0040* -0.0042** -0.0001 -0.0051** -0.0026*** 0.0003 -0.0773*** 
(-1.6852) (-1.8814) (-0.3854) (-1.9441) (-6.6153) (0.9221) (-2.3722) 
Real GDP growth rate
 t-1 
0.0546 0.1385 0.0188 0.4355* -0.1149*** -0.0727 5.6567 
(0.3096) (0.8399) (0.9248) (1.8444) (-4.2687) (-1.5421) (0.9721) 
ROA t-1 
0.3494 0.0905 0.0005 0.2634***  -0.0308 7.3848*** 
(1.4160) (0.7281) (0.2915) (5.8756)  (-0.9974) (8.3056) 
Non-performing loans t-1 
-0.0766** -0.1000*** -0.0049*** 0.0043 -0.1290*** 0.0329*** -5.3269*** 
(-2.1712) (-2.9215) (-3.3404) (0.1485) (-28.9076) (7.8668) (-23.1859) 
Provisions t-1 
0.4021** 0.1877 0.1199*** -1.1956*** -0.1397*** 0.0909*** -10.8053*** 
(1.7935) (1.0028) (20.0958) (-9.3481) (-7.7834) (7.3026) (-15.6731) 
Bank size t-1 
-0.0513*** -0.0519*** 0.0009*** 0.0172*** 0.0045*** -0.0010*** -0.0215* 
(-14.9586) (-16.4080) (10.2019) (8.9323) (12.8293) (-4.9795) (-1.8543) 
Risk-weighted assets 
ratio t-1 
-0.3099*** -0.3132*** 0.0008***  0.0062*** 0.0008* -0.2703*** 
(-27.3100) (-34.1581) (2.5998)  (8.0892) (1.7053) (-7.9155) 
Non-interest income t-1 
-0.0074 0.0075 -0.0002 -0.0107 0.0226*** 0.0014 0.0508 
(-0.5699) (0.7862) (-0.4696) (-1.5871) (10.9455) (1.3922) (0.9878) 
Liquidity t-1 
0.1010*** 0.1110 -0.0005 -0.2664*** -0.0085*** 0.0020** -0.1903*** 
(3.3601) (3.9610) (-1.4017) (-25.6181) (-5.4908) (2.3812) (-3.4613) 
Deposits ratio t-1 
-0.5867*** -0.5614*** 0.0004 0.1227*** 0.0205*** -0.0027* -0.8397*** 
(-17.4281) (-30.5709) (1.0954) (13.7575) (14.0694) (-1.8548) (-13.0737) 
Observations 466,192 466,187 395,693 466,289 466,438 436,632 435,249 
# of cross-sections 13,487 13,486 12,561 13,503 13,518 12,877 12,864 
# of sanctions 3,294 3,294 3,198 3,295 3,297 3,222 3,041 
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R2 0.6369 0.8191 0.7003 0.7961 0.3003 0.5412 0.5931 
Panel B. Wald tests 
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) -0.0051*** -0.0043*** -0.0003*** -0.0075*** 0.0005** 0.0007*** -0.0568*** 
Chi-square 22.6188 17.0935 18.7797 40.7378 4.833 36.8116 28.0238 
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-4, -3) -0.0063*** -0.0056*** -0.0003*** -0.0095*** -0.0002 0.0009*** -0.1133*** 
Chi-square 25.5172 22.2739 13.2202 46.6202 0.6172 39.4569 82.2432 
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-2, -1) -0.0040*** -0.0030*** -0.0003*** -0.0055*** 0.0013*** 0.0005*** -0.0002 
Chi-square 15.1753 9.6801 21.7522 23.9801 22.5687 22.7173 0.0005 
Sanct (-2, -1) – Sanct (-4, -3) -0.0023*** -0.0026*** 0.0000 -0.0040*** -0.0015*** 0.0004*** -0.1130*** 
Chi-square 9.8278 18.4098 0.6525 18.5244 39.509 20.7882 156.7214 
Notes: Panel A reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The regressions show the impact of an enforcement 
action, using banks subject to enforcement actions as the treatment group and the population of banks not subject to enforcement 
actions as the control group. Estimation method is fixed effects OLS with robust standard errors clustered by bank and time 
dummies. To include lagged and forward terms, the estimation period is 1999Q1-2011Q4. The explanatory variables are defined in 
Table 2. All sanctions included in our final working sample, i.e., 3,688 cases are being considered. Sanct (-4, -3) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for the -4 and -3 quarters before the sanction quarter and 0 otherwise. Sanct (-2, -1) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for the -2 and -1 quarters before the sanction quarter and 0 otherwise, Sanct  is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for the sanction quarter and 0 otherwise. Sanct (+1, +4) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the +1 through +4 
quarters after the sanction quarter and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) is the difference between the coefficient of 
Sanct (+1, +4) minus the average of the coefficients of Sanct (-4, -3) and Sanct (-2, -1)  and captures the average response of a bank to an 
enforcement action for the period 1 year around the event. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6.  Treatment effects model: All classes of enforcement actions - all sanction cases 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Dependent variable: Risk-based 
capital ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based capital 
ratio 
Tier 2 risk-
based capital 
ratio 
Risk-
weighted 
assets ratio 
ROA STDROA Z-score 
Panel A. Estimation results for the treatment effects model 
Intercept -0.1041*** -0.1829*** -0.0099*** 0.0482*** -0.0019*** -0.0069*** 1.6688*** (-13.0912) (-25.8506) (-23.6639) (6.3532) (-8.4117) (-23.663) (37.4937) 
Sanct
  -4 
0.0030* 0.0022 0.0005*** 0.0333*** -0.0035*** 0.0009*** -0.1242*** 
(1.6577) (1.2069) (5.0649) (13.4481) (-18.6077) (7.921) (-12.8447) 
Sanct
  -3 
-0.0001 -0.0008 0.0005*** 0.0288*** -0.0039*** 0.0011*** -0.1904*** 
(-0.0468) (-0.4312) (5.0644) (11.3591) (-20.2416) (10.3643) (-19.3203) 
Sanct 
-2 
-0.0027 -0.0030 0.0004*** 0.0237*** -0.0051*** 0.0014*** -0.2437*** 
(-1.4229) (-1.5463) (4.3974) (9.1632) (-26.1350) (12.6552) (-24.2263) 
Sanct 
-1 
-0.0051*** -0.0049** 0.0001 0.0183*** -0.0048*** 0.0016*** -0.2514*** 
(-2.6047) (-2.5056) (1.3170) (6.9460) (-24.4394) (14.3902) (-24.4695) 
Sanct  0.3998*** 0.4114*** -0.0159*** 0.8978*** -0.0184*** -0.0208*** 3.4446*** (14.6764) (15.1363) (-9.8921) (24.5019) (-5.0741) (-12.7672) (23.6669) 
Sanct +1 
-0.0066*** -0.0060*** 0 0.0111*** -0.0040*** 0.0017*** -0.2486*** 
(-3.1775) (-2.8807) (-0.0246) (3.9453) (-19.1691) (14.0752) (-22.7569) 
Sanct +2 
-0.0064*** -0.0057*** -0.0002 0.0080*** -0.0038*** 0.0017*** -0.2205*** 
(-2.9079) (-2.5918) (-1.5557) (2.7236) (-17.1699) (13.4854) (-19.2232) 
Sanct +3 
-0.0039* -0.0032 -0.0002* 0.0028 -0.0036*** 0.0018*** -0.1987*** 
(-1.6814) (-1.3782) (-1.8817) (0.9145) (-15.2562) (13.3143) (-16.5391) 
Sanct +4 
-0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0002* 0.0002 -0.0024*** 0.0015*** -0.1577*** 
(-0.8670) (-0.6554) (-1.7668) (0.0457) (-9.5964) (10.428) (-12.3605) 
Median of depend. 
variable
 t-1 
5.4485*** 6.7926*** 0.8113*** 0.6705*** -0.1116*** 1.8532*** 0.9890*** 
(93.3343) (117.642) (25.8281) (67.9891) (-24.9829) (34.162) (69.5083) 
Federal funds rate
 t-1 
0.0023*** 0.0011*** 0.0001*** 0.0006*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** -0.0054*** 
(23.0386) (11.252) (7.6858) (4.8382) (24.2045) (17.9102) (-10.2379) 
Real GDP growth rate
 t-1 
-1.0175*** -1.1399*** 0.0047*** 0.1027*** 0.0548*** -0.0102*** -0.5591*** 
(-86.5521) (-100.2061) (10.0862) (7.1308) -59.2471 (-19.0208) (-11.6666) 
ROA t-1 
0.7399*** 0.7052*** -0.0145*** 0.1768***  0.1316*** -0.7019*** 
(47.7379) (45.5897) (-17.2605) (8.4530)  (134.794) (-7.6795) 
Non-performing loans t-1 
-0.0899*** -0.1057*** -0.0103*** 0.3591*** -0.1498*** 0.0533*** -5.6492*** 
(-7.2181) (-8.5057) (-16.5831) (21.4254) (-120.283) (72.8985) (-85.6092) 
Provisions t-1 
1.3976*** 1.2244*** 0.1572*** -0.1560*** 0.0389*** 0.1055*** -6.3567*** 
(67.1691) (59.0171) (143.323) (-5.5753) (18.6604) (85.5138) (-57.4695) 
Bank size t-1 
-0.0169*** -0.0175*** 0.0007*** 0.0148*** 0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0631*** 
(-112.7128) (-117.2500) (91.3975) (73.7167) (22.4433) (-20.8739) (-79.3690) 
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Risk-weighted assets 
ratio t-1 
-0.3397*** -0.3406*** 0.0042***  0.0015*** 0.0030*** -0.7672*** 
(-258.2214) (-259.6108) (61.7216)  (11.6903) (38.8206) (-110.2760) 
Non-interest income t-1 
0.0694*** 0.0663*** -0.0003*** -0.0302*** 0.0253*** 0.0117*** -0.6551*** 
(36.3169) (34.7988) (-3.1187) (-11.7295) (135.469) (101.861) (-63.6931) 
Liquidity t-1 
0.2105*** 0.2126*** 0.0013*** -0.4751*** -0.0084*** 0.0030*** -0.1109*** 
(67.0889) (67.9443) (7.8178) (-114.950) (-26.6702) (15.9878) (-6.6560) 
Deposits ratio t-1 
-0.1600*** -0.2038*** -0.0021*** 0.0196*** 0.0027*** -0.0013*** -0.1760*** 
(-126.6001) (-144.0849) (-53.0136) (18.384) (37.2535) (-28.5523) (-41.0937) 
Panel B. First stage probit results - dependent variable: Sanct  
Intercept -2.5246*** -2.5246*** -2.4650*** -2.5246*** -2.5248*** -2.5132*** -2.5192*** (-321.3659) (-321.3659) (-301.300) (-321.4274) (-321.4073) (-315.2200) (-313.7039) 
Open dummy 0.3066*** 0.3066*** 0.2470*** 0.3065*** 0.3075*** 0.2959*** 0.2976*** (19.5905) (19.5905) (15.6206) (19.5862) (19.6656) (18.8499) (18.8601) 
Observations 405,186 405,186 339,603 405,276 405,393 386,859 386,397 
R2 0.0105 0.0105 0.0072 0.0105 0.0106 0.0100 0.0101 
Panel C. Wald tests 
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-4, -1) -0.0035** -0.0025* -0.0005*** -0.0205*** 0.0009*** 0.0004*** -0.0039 
Chi-square 5.78 2.90 51.68 107.57 33.13 22.6 0.26 
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-4, -3) -0.0062*** -0.0048*** -0.0006*** -0.0255*** 0.0002 0.0007*** -0.0491*** 
Chi-square 13.03 7.81 52.41 120.79 1.38 44.78 29.54 
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-2, -1) -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0004*** -0.0155*** 0.0015*** 0.0001*** 0.0412*** 
Chi-square 0.22 0.01 23.01 41.68 69.89 1.80 19.54 
Sanct (-2, -1) – Sanct (-4, -3) -0.0054*** -0.0046*** -0.0002** -0.0100*** -0.0013*** 0.0005*** -0.0902*** 
Chi-square 7.94 5.87 4.34 15.16 45.16 22.75 80.77 
Notes: Panel A reports coefficient estimates and z-statistics (in parentheses). The regressions show the impact of an enforcement action, 
using banks subject to enforcement actions as the treatment group and the population of banks not being subject to enforcement actions 
as the control group. The estimated model is a treatment effects model, which is robust to the potential endogeneity of enforcement 
actions. The first stage regressions are probit regressions with the variable opendummy as the instrumental variable. To include lagged 
and forward terms, the estimation period is 1999Q1-2011Q4. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. All sanctions included in 
our final working sample, i.e., 3,688 cases are being considered. Sanct  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the event quarter 
and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, Sanct (+1, +4),  Sanct (-4, -1),  Sanct (-4, -3) and  Sanct (-2, -1) are the averages of the relevant Sanct coefficients. ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Panel model: All classes of enforcement actions - only sanctions with a clean event window (-4,+4) quarters 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Dependent variable: Risk-based 
capital ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based 
capital ratio 
Tier 2 risk-
based 
capital ratio 
Risk-
weighted 
assets ratio 
ROA STDROA Z-score 
Panel A. Estimation results  
Intercept 1.5179*** 1.5499** 0.0059** 0.1912*** -0.0694*** 0.0047 0.0548 (23.3067) (31.6810)* (2.2508) (4.2796) (-16.1405) (1.2565) (0.1119) 
Sanct (-4, -3) 
0.0014 0.0012 0.0003*** 0.0094*** -0.0020*** 0.0000 -0.0545*** 
(1.2857) (1.1115) (4.3514) (6.0851) (-9.3807) (0.3609) (-4.9313) 
Sanct (-2, -1) 
0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003*** 0.0055*** -0.0028*** 0.0003** -0.1295*** 
(0.2008) (-0.1490) (3.8210) (3.3977) (-12.0681) (2.1779) (-10.1270) 
Sanct  -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002** 0.0016 -0.0026*** 0.0003** -0.1277*** (-0.0817) (-0.2298) (2.2978) (0.9535) (-8.9709) (2.3738) (-8.8897) 
Sanct (+1, +4) 
-0.002 -0.0016 0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0016*** 0.0006*** -0.1307*** 
(-1.5202) (-1.3053) (1.2293) (-0.8263) (-8.0244) (4.3821) (-10.2634) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 466,192 466,187 395,693 466,289 466,438 436,632 435,249 
# of cross-sections 13,487 13,486 12,561 13,503 13,518 12,877 12,864 
# of sanctions 2,272 2,272 2,208 2,272 2,273 2,228 2,197 
R2 0.6369 0.8191 0.7003 0.7961 0.2993 0.5408 0.5903 
Panel B. Wald tests 
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) -0.0028** -0.0021** -0.0002*** -0.0087*** 0.0008*** 0.0004*** -0.0387*** 
Chi-square 6.3688 3.9606 7.4886 50.6232 11.5341 17.5673 13.0526 
Notes: Panel A reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The regressions show the impact of an enforcement 
action, using banks who are subject to enforcement actions as the treatment group and the population of banks not being subject to 
enforcement actions as the control group. Estimation method is fixed effects OLS with robust standard errors clustered by bank 
and time dummies. Only enforcement actions of all classes for which there is a clean event window of (-4,+4) quarters around the 
event are examined, i.e., no other enforcement action of any class has been  imposed on a bank during the event window. To 
include lagged and forward terms, the estimation period is 1999Q1-2011Q4. The explanatory variables are defined in Table 2. 
Sanct (-4, -3) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the -4 and -3 quarters before the sanction imposed at τ and 0 
otherwise. Sanct (-2, -1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the -2 and -1 quarters before the sanction imposed at τ and 
0 otherwise, Sanct  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the sanction quarter and 0 otherwise. Sanct (+1, +4) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for the +1 through +4 quarters αφτερ the sanction imposed at τ and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, Sanct 
(+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) is the difference between the coefficient of Sanct (+1, +4) minus the average of the coefficients of Sanct (-4, -3) and 
Sanct (-2, -1)  and captures the average response of a bank to an enforcement action for the period 1 year around the event. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Panel model: Enforcement actions by class - only sanctions with a clean (-4,+4) quarters event  
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Dependent variable: Risk-based 
capital ratio 
Tier 1 risk-
based capital 
ratio 
Tier 2 risk-
based capital 
ratio 
Risk-
weighted 
assets ratio 
ROA STDROA Z-score 
Panel A. Estimation results  
Intercept 1.4865*** 1.5143*** 0.0074 0.1524 -0.0869*** 0.0043 0.1674 (10.0770) (9.7223) (0.9645) (1.1915) (-4.3743) (0.5304) -0.1753 
Class 1 Sanct (-4, -3) 
0.0020 0.0020 0.0006*** 0.0162*** -0.0039*** 0.0000 -0.1140*** 
(-1.0480) (1.0396) (4.6161) (6.6747) (-11.0755) (-0.2212) (-5.8434) 
Class 1 Sanct (-2, -1) 
-0.0008 -0.0015 0.0007*** 0.0084*** -0.0054*** 0.0005** -0.2775*** 
(-0.3888) (-0.8230) (4.6702) (3.2554) (-13.0070) (2.3215) (-11.8601) 
Class 1 Sanct  -0.0025 -0.0030 0.0005*** 0.0013 -0.0053*** 0.0007*** -0.2907*** (-1.1307) (-1.4403) (3.1532) (0.5096) (-9.6906) (2.9271) (-10.7766) 
Class 1 Sanct (+1, +4) 
-0.0065*** -0.0058** 0.0003 -0.0042 -0.0032*** 0.0012*** -0.3095*** 
(-2.5301) (-2.4331) (1.8220) (-1.6742) (-8.5667) (5.2983) (-13.0224) 
Class 2 Sanct (-4, -3) 
-0.0040 -0.0050 0.0002 0.0041 -0.0016** 0.0002 -0.0108 
(-1.1592) (-1.5223) (0.8633) (0.6882) (-1.9810) (0.4920) (-0.3613) 
Class 2 Sanct (-2, -1) 
-0.0038 -0.0040 0.0001 0.0046 -0.0010 0.0004 -0.0334 
(-1.0884) (-1.1900) (0.5587) (0.7642) (-1.4949) (0.7929) (-0.9408) 
Class 2 Sanct  0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0021 -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0367 (0.0687) (-0.0556) (0.4007) (0.2899) (-1.5115) (0.0658) (-0.9065) 
Class 2 Sanct (+1, +4) 
-0.0025 -0.0031 0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0019** 0.0002 -0.0296 
(-0.7335) (-0.9307) (0.2906) (-0.2901) (-2.2930) (0.4319) (-0.7370) 
Class 3 Sanct (-4, -3) 
0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0004** -0.0462** 
(0.2429) (0.0476) (0.9334) (-0.0292) (-1.0472) (1.9409) (-2.2627) 
Class 3 Sanct (-2, -1) 
0.0017 0.0015 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0297 
(0.8635) (0.7492) (0.0604) (0.0647) (-1.5876) (0.9359) (-1.4688) 
Class 3 Sanct  0.0014 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0221 (0.6892) (0.7400) (-0.3592) (-0.3129) (0.4706) (0.6878) (-1.0380) 
Class 3 Sanct (+1, +4) 
0.0016 0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0280 
(0.8568) (1.0337) (-0.8636) (-0.2789) (0.7591) (1.5248) (-1.3741) 
Class 4 Sanct (-4, -3) 
0.0023 0.0022 0.0000 0.0056** 0.0001 -0.0001* 0.0176 
(1.6056) (1.5880) (0.2963) (2.2623) (0.1989) (-1.7606) (1.2243) 
Class 4 Sanct (-2, -1) 
0.0017 0.0017 0.0000 0.0044* -0.0005* -0.0001 0.0070 
(1.2027) (1.2862) (-0.2931) (1.7680) (-1.8686) (-1.1008) (0.4789) 
Class 4 Sanct  0.0025 0.0026 -0.0001 0.0040 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0207 (1.6261) (1.7828) (-0.6343) (1.4994) (-1.1017) (-0.6080) (1.3102) 
Class 4 Sanct (+1, +4) 
0.0031** 0.0033** 0.0000 0.0038 -0.0005** -0.0002 0.0401** 
(2.0848) (2.3143) (-0.0693) (1.5007) (-2.1221) (-1.5751) (2.4418) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 466,192 466,187 395,693 466,289 466,438 436,634 435,251 
# of cross-sections 13,487 13,486 12,561 13,503 13,518 12,877 12,864 
# of class 1 sanctions 1,087 1,087 1,050 1,087 1,088 1,054 1,025 
# of class 2 sanctions 176 176 173 176 176 173 172 
# of class 3 sanctions 442 442 423 442 442 440 440 
# of class 4 sanctions 567 567 562 567 567 561 560 
R2 0.6369 0.8191 0.7002 0.7961 0.3003 0.5409 0.5922 
Panel B. Wald tests 
Class 1 enforcement actions 
     
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) -0.0071*** -0.0061*** -0.0003** -0.0164*** 0.0014*** 0.001*** -0.1138*** 
Chi-square 11.4475 8.6678 5.0319 71.6623 12.3973 31.1019 32.6437 
Class 2 enforcement actions     
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Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) 0.0014 0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0063 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0075 
Chi-square 0.4085 0.4564 0.3186 1.763 0.5754 0.0534 0.0423 
Class 3 enforcement actions     
    
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0007* 0.0000 0.0099 
Chi-square 0.1046 0.5491 2.3553 0.1312 2.7211 0.0257 0.3844 
Class 4 enforcement actions     
    
Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) 0.0011 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0278** 
Chi-square 1.124 1.8413 0.0080 0.3577 1.0192 0.4317 4.0275 
Notes: Panel A reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses). The regressions show the impact of an enforcement 
action, using banks which are subject to enforcement actions as the treatment group and the population of banks not being subject to 
enforcement actions as the control group. Estimation method is fixed effects OLS with robust standard errors and time dummies. 
Only enforcement actions of all classes for which there is a clean event window of (-4,+4) quarters around the event are examined, 
i.e., no other enforcement action of any class has been  imposed on a bank during the event window. To include lagged and forward 
terms, the estimation period is 1999Q1-2011Q4. The control variables are the same as in the previous tables and are not reported 
due to space considerations. Class X Sanct (-4, -3) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the -4 and -3 event quarters when 
an enforcement action of class X has been imposed at the sanction-quarter τ and 0 otherwise. Class X Sanct (-2, -1) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for the -2 and -1 event quarters when an enforcement action of class X has been imposed at the 
sanction-quarter τ and 0 otherwise. Class X Sanct  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the sanction-quarter when an 
enforcement action of class X has been imposed at before the sanction imposed at τ and 0 otherwise. Class X Sanct (+1, +4) is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the +1 through +4 event quarters when an enforcement action of class X has been 
imposed at the sanction-quarter after the sanction imposed at τ and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, Sanct (+1, +4) – Sanct (-1, -4) is the 
difference between the coefficient of Sanct (+1, +4) minus the average of the coefficients of Sanct (-4, -3) and Sanct (-2, -1)  of the relevant 
enforcement action and captures the average response of a bank to an enforcement action for the period 1 year around the event for 
this class of sanction. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of response variables around the event of the sanction (-8, +8 quarters)  
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Figure 2. Evolution of the response variables by class of enforcement action 
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Appendix. Classification of enforcement actions on a one-by-one basis 
 
Relevance for 
banks’ safety and 
soundness 
Class Reasons 
 
1 Capital adequacy and liquidity, asset quality, provisions and 
reserves, large exposures and exposures to related parties 
2 Internal control and audit systems, money laundering, bank 
secrecy, consumer protection and foreign assets control 
3 
Breaches of the requirements concerning the fitness and propriety 
of banks’ board members and senior management, as well as other 
persons closely associated with banks (institution affiliated parties) 
4 
Typical infringements of specific laws 
(e.g., Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Flood Insurance Act, Flood 
Disaster Protection Act, etc) 
 
Although the classification contains an element of inherent subjectivity, we are confident that it reflects quite accurately the 
comparative significance of the formal enforcement actions for banks’ safety and soundness, taking into account the Basel 
Committee’s categorization and the U.S. regulatory and supervisory practices. More specifically, the 2006 Basel Committee 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision explicitly delineates the hardcore of the so-called “prudential 
requirements”, or “safety and soundness requirements” (Principles 6 to 18) to encompass, on the one hand, capital 
adequacy, risk management (including liquidity risk management), quality of assets, adequacy of provisions and reserves, 
large exposure limits and control of exposures to related parties, as well as, on the other hand, internal control and audit 
systems, including anti-money laundering mechanisms. At a secondary level – as evidenced by the 2011 Basel Committee 
Consultative Document on Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision – prudential requirements also comprise the 
corporate governance of banks, including the fitness and propriety of Board members, senior management and bank’s wider 
group. The refinement of the taxonomy (i.e., creation of four classes) has been dictated by the need to capture the 
idiosyncratic features of the U.S. regulatory and supervisory framework in the field and the relevant literature distinguishing 
between “management-internal control weaknesses”, “financial problems”, “fraudulent behavior of affiliated parties” and 
“(typical) violations of laws like FDPA and HMDA” (Curry et al., 1999; Brunmeier and Willardson, 2006).    
 
 
 
